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BOOK REVIEW
NED SLINKER AND
ENGLAND'S ORDER
Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800.By J.M. Beattie. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Reviewed by Bany Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
J.M. Beattie's social history of crime and the courts in England from
1660 to 18001 provides a comprehensive background to the collection
of largely specific episodes examined by the contributors to Albion's Fatal
Tree.2 That collection provided a remarkable view of eighteenth-century
English society 'from below'. It continues to stimulate considerable debate
among eighteenth-century specialists, social historians, criminologists and
political theorists as well as legal scholars. Professor Beattie's approach
is different from the provocative Albion's Fatal Tree. Extensive and
valuable description of the legal process and interpretation of carefully
gathered statistics is preferred to the analysis of suggestive vignettes.
However, the end results are complementary, as Beattie's work tends
to confirm the social and political dimensions of criminal law suggested
by the contributors to Albion's Fatal Tree.
Lawyers and legal scholars might wonder why the criminal law
has come to preoccupy social historians. As Professor Beattie notes, the
records of crime and the courts provide insight into the behaviour of
ordinary people.3 Historical legal materials offer a picture of the vast
majority of people in society who left little direct evidence of their own.

o
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* Barry Wright, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University.
1 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University
Press, 1986).
2 D. Hay, et aL, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (New
York: Pantheon, 1975).
3 Beattie, supra,note 1 at 3.
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This history 'from below' has led some historians to questions central

to the unlocking of the meanings of eighteenth-century society and politics.
The ruling oligarchy's concern with social order, authority, and the value
of property found embodiment in the ideology and practice of the law. 4
It is not surprising that the best contemporary scholarship on law
in history has come from social historians. They have posed critical
questions about the nature of the relationship between law, the state,
and civil society. Legal scholars have had difficulties transcending the
traditional legal outlook that traces how the criminal law, and the legal
system at large, evolved independently of political and social forces. Within
this concept of law's neutrality and progress towards perfection, reform
is perceived to have been achieved through an incremental accumulation
of decency, through Royal Commissions and the efforts of polymathic
reformers like Howard and Bentham. 5 The leading and influential
historians of criminal law, James Fitzjames Stephen 6 and Sir Leon
Radzinowicz, 7 have contributed to this uncritical paradigm. Fortunately,
some legal scholars have begun to move away from the traditions of
apologist or constitutional legal history; traditions which are at root
fundamentally ahistorical.8 Legal scholars truly concerned about history
can no longer occupy a discrete category known as 'legal history'. They
must share the social historians' critical concern about law-in-history.
The history of law, in and of itself, is intellectually untenable because
the notion of the law existing in a vacuum 'above' society is itself
intellectually untenable.
An interdisciplinary approach to law in history is regarded by
traditionalists as fundamentally subversive. An example is Professor
Langbein's recent attack on the contributors to Albion'sFatalTree, wherein
he attempts to defend a traditional legal perspective on the role of criminal
law.9 He suggests that criminal law was not particularly central to
eighteenth-century society and political rule, that the courts were above
4 Hay, supra, note 2 at 13 (Preface).
5 Z. Bankowski & G. Mungham, "Schlock Talk: The Legal Problem and the Legal Textbook"
from Z, Bankowski and G. Mungham, Images of Law (London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1976) 32 at 33-34.
6 J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: MacMillan & Co., 1883).

7 L Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administrationfrom 1750, 4
vols. (London: Stevens, 1948-1968).
8 See B. Wright, "Towards New Canadian Legal History" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 349.
I suggest that the common-law tradition causes many lawyers to visualize legal development as
evolutionary and neutrally directed by impersonal processes of the legal system. Past ideas are
used for present day authority, regardless of historical context. This traditional approach is ahistorical
because it is the antithesis of historical concern with change, contradiction, and explanation.
9 J. Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws" (1983), 98 Past and Present 96.
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society and politics, protecting both rich and poor from a well-defined,
but marginal criminal element. This was a function that they continuously
performed from medieval times to the present: "The criminal law is simply
the wrong place to look for the active hand of the ruling classes. From
the standpoint of the rulers, the criminal justice system occupies a place
not much more central than the garbage collection system."' 0
This traditional view has been criticized by historians who see the
criminal law as an important form of ruling class hegemony. In response,
Peter Linebaugh continues the rubbish analogy, but does not trivialize
it:
Professor Langbein may find garbage collection and criminal law of no great
importance. To those who lived in fear of the hangman and typhoid, however,
such systems were important indeed.... In both areas, "the active hand of the
ruling class" - not in Langbein's sense of conscious conspiracy, but in Hay's
sense of social control - was apparent and heavy.I

Professor Beattie's contribution arrives in the thick of this debate.
Although he steers well clear of its explicit manifestations, his research
does tend to confirm the view that study of the criminal law provides
an important insight into eighteenth-century English society and political
rule, and that the criminal law was an important influence on social
order. The period that is the context of Beattie's careful investigation
is one of sweeping transformation. During this period, there were radical
changes in the definition of offences (especially the proliferation of
property offences), the administration of the courts (accompanying new
forms of state intrusion), and the imposition of punishment (from corporal
and capital punishment's focus on the prisoner's body and emphasis on
public example to the initial efforts to establish the penitentiary with
its focus on the prisoner's mind, separation from society, and the underlying
objective of class discipline). These changes were the result of pressures
stemming from social transformations in political and economic power.
Although Beattie studiously avoids using such broad brush strokes, he
does make clear that underneath the discourse of law reform, the rolling
tide of urbanization, and the concomitant development of wage labour,
there are concentrations of social disorder that demand new legal
responses.
Professor Beattie's evidence is based on the Surrey Assizes and
Quarter Sessions, with comparative material drawn from the courts of
Sussex and the Old Bailey. The focus on Surrey provides a balance of
10 Ibid at 117.

11p.Linebaugh, "(Marxist) Social History and (Conservative) Legal History: A Reply to
Professor Langbein" (1985), 60 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 212 at 242.
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rural and urban aspects of crime and its relation to the legal process.
The result is a comprehensive overview of the social meaning of criminal
offences and of the changing manner in which the accused was dealt
with by the courts. Beattie's study is broken into two broad sections:
"Criminality, Offenders and Offences," which deals with the social
meaning of prosecuted offences, and "the Courts and the Administration
of Criminal Justice," which deals with the ways in which offenders were
processed by the courts and the changing punitive measures used against
them. These two sections contain revealing new research and demand
separate attention.
II. CRIMINALITY: OFFENDERS AND THE PROSECUTION OF
OFFENCES
Professor Beattie reproduces part of a fascinating exchange drawn
from the Public Advertiser in 1764 between Ned Slinker, "footpad,
pickpocket and housebreaker" and James Maclean, "esquire and highwayman." Maclean explains his fall into crime:
I cannot reproach myself with doing anything unbecoming a Gentleman. When
the scanty allowance of five hundred a year that I had from that Old Gripe my
Father was gone, having always entertain'd a just contempt for the Pedantry of
Study, and being above mere mechanic Employment, I embraced the only Scheme
left for a Man of Spirit, and commenced a Gentleman of the Shade, in which
Occupation I have acquitted myself with equal Courage, Honour, and Genius. t 2

Slinker's fall is not explained, but he is undoubtedly a caricature of the
more common criminal. Distinctions drawn between the romantic figure
and the habitually deviant subculture of 'little crooks', as Professor
Langbein refers to the majority of offenders before the Old Bailey docks, 13
or even the class warrior, tend to play into the contrived moral discourse
of fallen men, dreadful exemplars and tragic heroes. Such distinctions
perpetuate popular myths about criminality and obscure the social realities
of crime. 14 Slinker's ilk was not a marginal group. The Slinkers of England
came from the vast mass of English society living under difficult
circumstances and causing considerable anxiety for a ruling oligarchy
concerned about property, social order, and the most effective means
12 Beattie, supra, note 1 at 152-53.
13 Langbein, supra,note 9 at 101.
14 Linebaugh, supra,note 11 at 225.
Can these offenders be justly characterized as "little crooks" or "class warriors"? A historian,
perhaps, is less interested in the labels than in exploring the nature of offenders and their
offences within their social and historical context. The grouping of the cases-work related,
residence-related, sex-related, and public appropriation that is suggested by even the most
cursory historical investigation suggests a dynamic of class relations ... that might explain
the existence of the offences as a matter of contingent historical fact.

Book Review

1986]

of exercising authority. The mechanism of the criminal law was an
important means of meeting these concerns.
Professor Beattie's examination ofvarious pre-trial matters, especially
the role of the private prosecutor and the record of indictments, provides
us with a more rigorous and less caricatured picture of the behaviour
that lay behind offences and how they came to be prosecuted. In this
manner, an image of the character and social meaning of prosecuted
offences is created that offers evidence of public attitudes toward crime,
authority, and the role of law as a social institution. These findings suggest
that crime and the role of law were not as marginal as Professor Langbein
asserts.
A.

The PrivateProsecutor

In order to answer the question of what typically led to prosecutions,
Professor Beattie begins by examining the important role of the private
prosecutor. The state and police did not take over initiating criminal
proceedings and apprehending criminals until well into the nineteenth
century. The victim was the key agent in instituting a case and seeing
it through various stages. 15 The decision to prosecute was influenced
by a number of social factors.
The character of the offence is found to be very important, and
Professor Beattie traces changing social attitudes towards violent and
property offences. 16 Violent offences were less likely to be settled by
self-help and more likely to be reported and formally prosecuted towards
the end of the eighteenth century. 17 There was also a dramatic rise in
the prosecution of property offences.' 8 Decisions to prosecute were
influenced by the value of property involved, the nature of the activity
surrounding the offence, and whether the offence was subject to benefit
of clergy or was non-clergyable, with obvious implications as to whether
the offence was capital or not. Most significant were considerations of
cost and community factors. Prosecutions required money and the prospect
of having to lay out greater sums as the case proceeded. Prosecutors
were invariably persons of property, while the offender was usually an
'outsider' or not well integrated in terms of the local status quo.' 9 Yet
Professor Beattie suggests:
15

See D. Hay, "Controlling the English Prosecutor" (1983), 21 Osgoode Hall LJ. 165.

16
17
18
19

Beattie, supra, note 1 at 75-198.
Ibid at 137-39.
Ibid at 140.
Ibid at 195.
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One does not have to think that the legitimacy of the criminal law was accepted

in its entirety throughout society to acknowledge that when it came to straightforward crime against property ... there was no sharp class distinction between
20
rich men of large property and the large majority of the working population.

However, the large majority of the working population were unlikely
to possess the sort of property that would be protected by the law and,
if they did, few could afford the costs of proceeding. As the eighteenthcentury progressed and the apparent tide of crime rose, various innovations
were introduced to facilitate prosecutions and involve the less wealthy.
Prosecution associations, directives to local magistrates, the watch, and
other forms of surveillance served the interests of middling property
owners. Statutory rewards and thief-takers constitute a possible exception.
However, the use of 'blood money' to induce the poor to prosecute arguably
reflected the hegemonic pressures of the state rather than an attempt
to democratize prosecutions.
B. Criminality and the Meaning of the Indictments
The record of indictments not only provides the historian with
evidence of crimes actually prosecuted, but reveals potentially valuable
indicia of the larger social reality of crime. Methodological issues are
raised concerning the indictment levels. Do patterns in the judicial record
suggest larger patterns in crime unlikely to have been observed by
contemporaries? Or should one take a narrower approach and hold that
the indictments merely reflect the legal process involving the opinions
of prosecutors and officials? These questions highlight traditional criminology's unreliable use of statistics. They question whether the criminal
law serves as a system of power where prosecutions reflect the behaviour
of those who control the law more than the experience of those subject
to it.21 Professor Langbein's analysis of the Old Bailey sessions from
1754 to 1756 reflect an uncritical use of thejudicial record. 22 He concludes
that it is "hard to find figures worthy of romance, even social romance,
among the shoplifters, pickpockets, pilfering housemaids, and dishonest
apprentices who populated the Old Bailey Dock." 23 Langbein fails to
provide any context, historical specificity, or any account of changes
in the organization of control. 24 So, as Linebaugh points out, in the years
Ibid at 196.
21 D. Hay, "War, Death and Theft in the Eighteenth-Century: The Record of the English
Courts" (1982), 95 Past and Present 117 at 118-19.
20

22 Langbein, supra, note 9 at 99-101.
23 Ibid at 100.
24 Linebaugh, supra, note 11 at 225.
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Langbein examines there was an elaboration of the law of theft with
the introduction of property distinctions: "Such distinctions correspond
to new patterns of material and economic life. The shop, the warehouse,
the stables, the workplace, and the home, from the standpoint of larceny,
was decisive to the fate of the offender, determining whether he or she
25
would be hanged."
The monetary value of the stolen goods assumed new importance,
26
reflecting a decline of personal relations and a rise of commodified value.
Douglas Hay has taken a reflective and rigorous examination of
indictment levels. On one hand, Hay finds that indictment levels corresponded to incidence of dearth and the timing and nature of demobilization, suggesting that the indictments do provide a clear picture of
the reality of crime.27 On the other hand:
Heightened anxieties among those with property and power, particularly in times
of acute political tension or economic crisis, result in calls for more rigorous
enforcement of the law, and sometimes, as a result, in the creation of crime by
the redefinition of acts to make them more serious offences, and by arrests and
prosecutions of people who in easier times would not have found themselves before
the courts. 28

Hay concludes that the record of indictments reflects both the behaviour
of those subject to the law and of those controlling it.29
Professor Beattie appears to follow Hay in concluding that fluctuations of indictments broadly reflect both the changing reality of crime
and the changing attitudes towards it by the prosecutors and those
responsible for the administration ofjustice.0 For Beattie, shifts in property
offence indictments were related to short term innovations, like the watch
and rewards, and more fundamental changes in social and economic
circumstances, such as food prices and demobilization. In turn, when
it became difficult for the poor to support themselves, offences would
provoke a sense of social crisis and induce prosecutorial zeal. Nonetheless,
Beattie concludes that indictments are a fragile guide to criminality. The
issues surrounding the use of indictments serve as warning about the
limitations of quantitative methods. As Douglas Hay suggests:
It [the simple statistical analysis of indictments] can, in fact, be a distraction if
it leads one to the assumption that property definitions are unproblematic, that
they do not change, that there is social agreement on what is legitimate behaviour
25

Ibid at 221.

26 Ibid at 222.

Hay, supra, note 21 at 145.
Ibid at 152.
29 Ibid at 158.
30 Beattie, supra, note 1 at 220.
27
28
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and rightful ownership. This was clearly not the case in the eighteenth-century
when the mercantile, industrial and landed 6lites of England were pressing in many
different areas to redefine and restrict the property rights of the poor, to make
them more amenable to the disciplines of industrial capitalism, and to divide
recalcitrant plebeian
communities into stigmatized criminals and acquiescent
31
labouring poor.

III. THE COURTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
In the second part of the book, Professor Beattie moves from the
broad area of the social dimensions of crime to direct consideration of
those who were tried before the courts. Beattie's examination of the nature
and timing of changes in the trial and the changes in the administration
of punishment debunks the leading traditional view that the criminal
law evolved towards efficiency and humanity sparked by reform pressure.32 Significant changes took place throughout the period Beattie
examines. Although they were in full flood by the end of the eighteenth
century, they were not the result of reform pressure against a previously
inflexible ancien regime. To a certain extent, on the level of detailed
administrative problems, the criminal justice system changed under its
own momentum. More fundamentally, the level and forms of 'crime
problems' experienced in a rapidly growing London were a pre-cursor
of things to come elsewhere. Increasing property offences, perceived as
moral decay and social disorder, threatened the rule of the 61ite. Changes
to the legal mechanism reflected a political problem.
A.

Nature and Timing of Changes in the Trial

Once the offender was indicted, he or she was dealt with by a system
that was shot through with discretion. This reflected the Weberian notion
of traditional authority of Khadi justice.33 The identity of the offender
was as important as what was done. An exemplary and public exercise
of authority were seen as necessary to stave off disorder. However,
personalized discretion became increasingly ineffective with urbanization
and the decline of community. As a result, there was a haphazard move
towards 'formal legal rationality'.34 Changes to examinations before the
magistrate, the introduction of legal counsel, shift in the onus of proof,
31 Hay, supra, note 21 at 159.

32 See Stephen, supra, note 6, and Radzinowicz, supra, note 7.
33 M. Weber, On Economy and Society, trans. E.Shils and M.Rheistein (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1966) at 336.
34 Ibid at 63. See generally, Cotterrell, "The Sociology of Max Weber" in D. Sugarman,
ed., Legality, Ideology and the State (London, Toronto: Academic Press, 1983) c. 4.
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development of rules of evidence, and transformation in the relationship
between judge and jury were hardly the result of enlightened reform.
They stemmed from changing social conditions and the demands of rule.
The preliminary proceedings, 'coming to trial' as Professor Beattie
puts it, focussed on the magistrate's examination. The examination was
not designed as an inquiry into the truth of the charge. Rather, it served
as a means of collecting the strongest evidence of the prisoner's guilt.
During the course of the eighteenth century, the examination took on
the characteristics of a judicial inquiry, 35 even though the changes were
not fully codified until the Jervis Acts of 1848.36 According to Beattie,
the increasing role of lawyers was an important impetus of change. 37
Also, the large increase in numbers coming to trial, resulting in overburdening of the courts, and in incidents like the "Black Session" at
the Old Bailey when gaol fever spread throughout the court, were
important.
Professor Beattie's superb description of the criminal trial debunks
many of the cherished notions of ancient English liberties derived from
the jury trial and the Rule of Law. The principle of 'innocent until proven
guilty' with the burden on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt emerged in the nineteenth century. Under the older form of trial,
the underlying assumption was that if the accused was innocent, he or
she ought to be able to demonstrate it to the jury's satisfaction by the
quality and character of replies to the prosecutor's evidence. Trials
proceeded at a blistering pace, and prisoners had little or no knowledge
of the prosecution's evidence. Thejudge alone was responsible for ensuring
that the prisoner had a brief opportunity to prove his or her innocence.38
Professor Beattie finds that the introduction of lawyers to the criminal
trial served as an important force of change. Their role was not merely
a matter of developing professional hegemony. Concern about the stability
of the Hanoverian regime led to the encouragement of lawyers acting
as prosecuting counsel in sensitive cases. However, memories of the highly
political use of lawyers in treason proceedings in the 1660s were fresh.
As a concession to balance, defence counsel began to be admitted at
the Old Bailey.39 The growing use of counsel on the defence side put
greater pressure on the prosecution to prove its case. Effective cross-

35 Beattie, supra,note 1 at 274.
36 See W. Pue, "The Criminal Twilight Zone: Pre-trial Procedures in the 1840's" (1983)

21 Alta. L. Rev. 335.
37 Beattie, supra,note I at 280.
38 Ibid at 340-41.
39 Ibid at 355-59.
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examination shifted the burden of proof from the defendant and prompted
the development of evidentiary rules.
However, it is important to stress that for most of the period the
prisoner's fate depended not so much on an effective case, as on the
exercise of discretion. Discretion was exercised by the grand juries.
Although they often threw out bills, Professor Beattie finds that they
were anxious to send forward property cases thought to strike at the
public interest.40 An even more significant aspect of discretion was the
operation of trial jury verdicts and royal pardons, which reflected the
variable personal application of power according to the perceived level
of disorder. A jury could find a prisoner guilty, not guilty, or find a
partial verdict - that is, guilty of a lesser charge. As capital punishments
were broadened and benefit of clergy was narrowed during the eighteenthcentury, this discretionary power assumed immense significance. Acquittals tended to reflect the jury's general view of crime and the relation
of the particular crime to their own interests. 4t Partial verdicts became
more common as alternatives to hanging expanded. If the jury failed
to show leniency, the judge could reprieve the accused and allow a request
for royal pardon. This procedure heightened the exemplary drama by
encompassing the solemnity of the death sentence and the uncertainty
during the reprieve period. Pardons were very much a mechanism of
regulating admissions to the gallows and involved practical political
considerations. Pardons that were granted were usually conditional and
based on available secondary punishments. Accordingly, both partial
verdicts and pardons were the focal points of discretion in a discretionladen system. This reflected the nature and essence of the criminal court's
function; a personal and particularistic administration influenced by the
abstract character of the offence, the prevailing state of crime, and the
offender's utility as an exemplar.42 As Beattie makes clear, the discourse
of equality of treatment and certainty of punishment was the ideology
of the future. 43 The politics that underlay the essence of discretion is
summarized by Professor Beattie:
The execution of a thief or robber sent a message to the broad ranks of the labouring
poor as a terrible example of the consequences of falling into immoral habits
and breaking the law. The gallows also got rid of the occasional individual who
was permanently committed to a life of crime. But fundamentally the value of
40

Ibid at 403.

41 Ibid at 408-20.
42 Ibid at 426. Beattie points out that a contemporary observer Cottu stressed how the English
courts, unlike the French courts, demonstrated indifference to the details of the individual case
and little anxiety about specific guilt or innocence. Ibid at 420.
43 Ibid at 427.
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public hangings ... was the reminder of what eventually lay in store for those
who strayed far from the paths of duty and obedience. That required not hundreds

of victims - for that could only have confused the message - but a few only,
and a number that could be varied depending on the state of crime and the present
danger to the social order. The regulation of that flow and the choice of those
who would serve as examples was very much the business of the courts and the

criminal trial.44

Unfortunately, few specific details are provided concerning the relationship between the courts and the processes of political rule. Professor
Beattie does point out that emphasizing legalities misses out on the
essential agreement and co-operation between the jury, judge and the
political 6lte.4s However, he also suggests that juries acquitted a remarkable number of people, and he questions Hay's assertion that a
more democratic jury would acquit even greater numbers. 46 The point
remains that both judge and jury exercised discretion in a manner that
was appropriate to governmental demands.
Composed largely of small and middling property owners, juries
shared a common perception of the social order with the bench and
political 6lite.47 Loyalty was cemented by the jury's role in the legal
process. This view clashes with the ideology of jury independence, but
arguably this ideology served as disguise and mystification. Prominent
political and legal writers, like Sir John Hawles, extolled the ideology,
making much of lessons learned from earlier seventeenth-century battles
such as Judge Kelyng's jury bullying and Bushel's case.48 Even modern
scholars, like Professor Langbein, suggest that the eighteenth-century
jury was autonomous, objectively deciding 'open and shut' cases. 49
However, although the jury members' social stakes might not have been
identical to the judiciary and the political 6lite at large, they were part
of a social continuum defined by property. Their interests were far more
closely allied with and dependent on the 6lite than the working population
that constituted the vast majority of offenders.50
44

Ibid at 423.

45

Ibid at 408.

46

Ibid and Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in Hay, supra, note 2 at 38-

39.
47 See Linebaugh, supra, note 11 at 230; 3 Geo. 11, c. 25 (1731); 4 Geo. 11, c. 7 (1732)
(property ownership qualifications for service). See also, Sir John Hawles, The Englishman's Right;
A Dialogue between a Barristerat Law and a Juryman, 10th ed. (London: Reprinted by the London
Corresponding Society, 1793).
48 Beattie, supra, note 9 at 407.
49 Langbein, supra,note 9 at 108.
50 Linebaugh, supra, note 11 at 230-31. See for instance J. Bunyan, Pilgrim'sProgress(London:
Cresset Press, 1928) which went on at length about the venality of jurors. Cornish described how
"regular special jurors... lived off the guinea which each case brought, and... knew continuance
of their stipend depended on bringing a verdict for the crown." The Jury (1968) at 131-32.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 24 No. 3

As an additional matter, it is important to point out that judges
had no direct power to choose alternative punishments to hanging at
the post-verdict stage. Nonetheless, they had considerable influence over
the process by which prisoners received executive clemency, a highly
developed adjunct similar to sentencing. Hay suggests that the ostensible
grounds for mercy were that the offence was minor, the convict was
of good character or that the offender's status made mitigation appropriate.
In reality, these grounds were smoke-screens, and the claims of class
served more than the claims of humanity within the requirements of
exemplary hangings. 51 Langbein and Radzinowicz notwithstanding, both
of whom assume that the pardon was exercised in a social and political
vacuum, 52 Hay has found that rather than reflect increasing humanity,
pardons reflected a limiting of the number executed within boundaries
acceptable to public opinion. As such, pardons worked in class-biased
ways through the patronage network. Respectable connection or high
social station served to mitigate far more often and successfully than
desperate poverty.53 The discretion available at the pardoning stage
explains the discrepancy between proliferating capital statutes and the
declining number of hangings. 54 There was very direct communication
between the bench and executive concerning crowded gaols and local
disorder. Emphasis on character and other humanitarian grounds merely
reflects that judges were professionally expected to stress the so-called
'merits' in their reports.
B. Punishment The Development of Secondary Alternatives
The final stage of the process reflected aspects of all spheres of
the administration of criminal law. While recognizing the importance
of the enlargement of the capital code, Professor Beattie provides
important new research on the broadening of secondary punishments.
Again, the reader is struck by the personalized discretion and larger
political dimensions implicit in the criminal justice system.

51 D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in Hay, supra, note 2 at 44-45.
52 See for instance, Langbein, supra, note 9 at I 11. See also R. King, "Decision Makers and
Decision Making in English Criminal Law" (1984) 27, 1 Historical Journal 25. Both Langbein
and King focus on a small sample from a selected period in the Ryder assize which suggests
highly controlled discretion. During the particular period selected, George II revived an old custom
by instructing judges concerning their duties on circuit.

53 D. Hay, "Reply to Langbein" [unpublished].
54 Mystified by this discrepancy, Radzinowicz suggested that Parliament and judges were at
odds -judges pardoned greater numbers as Parliament enacted more capital statutes. Supra, note 7.
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The development of transportation and imprisonment, in particular,
transformed the treatment of convicted felons by the second half of the
eighteenth century. Before 1660, all felonies were potentially of a capital
nature for prisoners unable to plead benefit of clergy because of illiteracy:
a variety of corporal punishments, as well as fines and imprisonment,
were available to prisoners committing non-felony crimes. Considerable
concern developed by 1660 with regards to serious offenders who
successfully pleaded benefit of clergy and were discharged with a branding
on the cheek. For the next fifty years a number of expedients were tried.
The end result was the TransportationAc4 1718, which established
transportation to the American colonies as a regular punishment. The
legislation emerged at a time when it was recognized that an effective
system needed to be well-funded and well-administered.55 The legislation
changed the way the courts dealt with serious offenders:
Transportation decisively broadened the options available to the courts and

transformed the patterns of punishment in the second quarter of the eighteenth
century. It removed the deep misgivings about benefit of clergy that had been
so evident at least since the Restoration.... Transportation was immediately taken
up because it bridged the gap between capital punishment and the branding of
benefit of clergy that typified the penal system at the Restoration. Since it could

also be employed to punish vagrants, it erected a large middle ground in which
punishment of serious offenders overlapped. Transportation created a penal system
56

that could never again operate without a centrally dominant secondary punishment.

It is important to stress that transportation did not displace or
challenge the utility of capital punishment. It became an important adjunct
to a system that centred on capital punishment and provided an alternative,
substantial punishment that prevented an offender from simply returning
to society. More importantly, transportation as a condition of pardon
became a crucial aspect of a discretionary system that made the selective
57
application of the increasing number of capital statutes feasible.
However, even before the American Revolution wars closed off the
main destination for the transported, the crises of disorder in London
led to a search for effective penalties for the majority of property crimes
that could not be regularly punished by costly transportation. Imprisonment and hard labour in the chain gangs became more prominent, along
with expansion of the capital code and calls for its stricter enforcement. 58
55 Beattie, supra,note 1 at 470, 506.
56 Ibid at 512-13.
57 Ibid at 518.
58 Radzinowicz wrongly portrays the House of Commons Committee on Criminal Law in
1757 as a force of humanist reform. However, as Beattie points out, the Committee did not call
for the displacement of capital punishment by imprisonment. Rather, it sought the reduction of
transportation in favour of hard labour in chain gangs put on display as "examples of justice."
See Beattie, supra, note 1 at 520.
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The American Revolution saw the establishment of the notorious hulks
(floating workhouses on the Thames) and the eventual return to transportation in 1784, with the establishment of a penal colony in New South
Wales. However, the Penitentiary Acq 1779 was a precursor of things
to come. By the turn of the nineteenth century, a term of imprisonment
became the most common sentence in non-capital property cases.59
By the end of the eighteenth century, the old penal regime which
stressed physical punishment and public example, gave way to a new
system which stressed the 'rehabilitation' of the mind and physical
separation. Judges began to stress certainty of punishment and to make
the magnitude of punishment commensurate with the gravity of the
offence. The change in the penal regime marked the transformation of
the entire system:
A system ofjustice that had been intensely personal and concerned with the particular
attributes of the offenders and that had conceived of punishment as a means of
deterring others by bloody example was giving way to a system of administration
that came to emphasize equality and uniformity of treatment as ideals and the
thought of punishment as reformative. Violent punishments that attacked the body,
carried out in public, were replaced by incarcerations and punishments that aimed
to reconstruct the prisoner's mind and heart. Undoubtedly the earlier system had
served reasonably effectively the needs of rural communities, maintaining serious
offenses at an acceptable level while supporting and enhancing local men of property
and influence. But it had been clear at least as early as the second half of the
seventeenth-century that it did not serve as adequately the needs of an urban
society in which vast amounts of moveable property provided targets and temptations
for a large population of men and women who were both more independent
of
60
authority and more liable to suffer from extreme and sudden deprivation.

While it is very important to examine the class discipline that underpinned
the discourse of 'equality and uniformity of treatment' and 'reformative
statement', the central point - the changing nature of the crime problem
with the rise of urban centres serving as a catalyst for that change suggests the importance of the criminal law in meeting the new demands
on political rule.
To summarize, from the Restoration to the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the changes in criminal law, procedure, and punishment reflected
a larger transformation in the administration of criminal justice. This
did not depend on Enlightenment reform, but rather on the anxieties
and concerns of 9ites about increasing levels of social disorder that were
influenced by forces unleashed at the beginning of the Industrial

59 For a review of scholarship concerning the rise of the penitentiary, see M. Ignatieff, "State,

Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment" inSugarman
ed., supra, note 34 at c. 8, 183.
60 Beattie, supra, note I at 636-37.
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Revolution. Professor Beattie admits that the criminal law represented
an important means of political rule:
The criminal law in the eighteenth-century served several purposes. It acted broadly

to sustain and legitimize the established social and economic and political
arrangements of the society, and in some crucial areas it was enlisted in the effort
to effect changes that powerful groups in society wanted. In addition, the

opportunities for the exercise of discretion at all stages of criminal administration
provided occasions in which men of the propertied elite could exercise their influence

and thus
enhance the base upon which their local reputation and local authority
61
rested.

However, this means of political rule underwent changes as the problems
of rule became more complicated in urban centres. When the criminal
law did not appear to be effective in preserving order, its administration
was subject to criticism. Disorder and rising rates of property crime in
London sparked changes to the judicial process and punishment. 62 As
Beattie points out, landed men may have resisted the loss of the means
to enhance their personal power through discretionary justice at a
community level. But, as it became clear that features of the old legal
system proved inadequate for maintaining social order in impersonal
urbanizing areas, the rejection of the old system was decisive. 63
Professor Beattie goes to great lengths to provide a picture of the
social context and detailed institutional influences on the wide changes
in the administration of criminal justice during the eighteenth century.
He alludes to the importance of law to political power, how the mechanics
of the legal process and the broader ideological effects of the law promoted
order and 61ite rule. Beattie, therefore, provides an incomparable description of the social conditions that produced Ned Slinker and of the
legal processes that he would be subject to; a revealing analysis of the
often desperate search for more effective penal policy; and the importance
of the criminal law to the 6lite's political rule. Perhaps the expectation
of the next logical step to make explicit the concretization of the relations
between law and politics in the continuing maintenance of order is overly
demanding. Such a task requires moving beyond the social contextualization of law to a critical approach that encompasses a developed
theory of state and an appreciation of the ideological dimensions of law.
Beattie fails to do this and thus inadequately addresses the translation
of class interests through the manipulation of the law as well as the
larger hegemonic forces involved. However, this is no easy task. As
Douglas Hay has pointed out, these processes were rarely made explicit:
61
62

Ibid at 621.
Ibid

63 Ibid at 632.
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There is a danger... of giving the impression that a system of authority is something,
rather than the actions of living men ... much of the ideological structure
surrounding the criminal law was the product of countless short term decisions
... the necessity of gauging reactions to executions was an immediate problem
of public order, not a plot worked out by eighteenth-century experts in public
relations for a fee. The difficulty for the historian of law is twofold. He [she]
must make explicit convictions that were often unspoken, for if left unspoken
we cannot understand the actions of the men who hold them. Yet in describing
how convictions and actions molded the administration of justice, he [she] must
never forget that history is made by men [women], not by the Cunning of Reason
or the Cunning of the System. The course of history is the result of a complex
of human actions - purposive, accidental, sometimes determined - and it cannot
be reduced to one transcendent purpose. The cunning of a ruling class is a more
substantial concept, however, for such a group is agreed on ultimate ends. However
much they believed in justice (and they did); however sacred they held property
(and they worshipped it); however merciful they were to the poor (and many were);
the gentlemen of England knew that their duty
was, above all, to rule. On that
64
depended everything. They acted accordingly.

In this elegant and effective manner, some of the difficulties facing

the social historian in exploring the relationship between politics, class
and the criminal law are posed. Professor Beattie provides a valuable
foundation for further critical work on an important period of social
change and challenge to the status quo.

64 Hay, supra, note 51 at 52-53.

